In the previous post with the regression example, you were criticizing (if I understand correctly) the interpretation of statistical models as "mechanistic" (or "causal") models. Here it seems you argue against their interpretation (or even usage?) as phenomenological models as well?
Surely a phenomenological model alone without _any_ accompanied mechanism is something very limited, but there could still be value in it sometimes.
Anyways, looking forward for the following posts, sounds like this is going to be most interesting and relevant.
"probability as a measurement device" as in "# of samples we need to estimate 'x'?"
i'm not happy about asking here
Damek, you must join us in newsletter land. it's nice here.
and yes "# of samples to guarantee property z" is what I mean. estimate x being an important case of z.
In the previous post with the regression example, you were criticizing (if I understand correctly) the interpretation of statistical models as "mechanistic" (or "causal") models. Here it seems you argue against their interpretation (or even usage?) as phenomenological models as well?
Surely a phenomenological model alone without _any_ accompanied mechanism is something very limited, but there could still be value in it sometimes.
Anyways, looking forward for the following posts, sounds like this is going to be most interesting and relevant.