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Combaticus Wombaticus III's avatar

You’re missing something. One key aspect of Popper’s theory on falsification is the argument it acts as a criterion for science. Most people fixate on this as being a way to distinguish between science and non-science, however there is another way to view it. To return to your example of bowling balls in space, when said bowling ball falls at the same speed as feathers, you are not proving Newton’s Second Law, you are failing to disprove it. However, what that means is that insofar as you are in the business of dropping bowling balls, your failure to disprove the law means that it does not matter if Newton’s Second Law is accurate or not, only that the difference between it and the truth is such that it does not impact on life. Insofar as a theory in a given environment is unfalsifiable, it means you do not need to care about whether it is true or not. This observation I’d argue is far more valuable that the argument of repeated falsification.

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John Quiggin's avatar

Looking forward to more in this series. But in the reconstructed version I first learned, the logical positivists believed in affirming the consequent ( the possibility of generating confirmatory hypotheses was their criterion for a meaningful statement). Popper then improved on them by replacing verification with falsification, and by making it a criterion for a scientific statement rather than for a meaningful one (as mentioned by CW III below).

Then Lakatos fixed up a lot of the problems with Popper, avoiding the difficulty of the critical test etc. And Bayesian reasoning helped a bit more.

As I said, a reconstructed version, but seems reasonably close to the mark.

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